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Purpose - The purpose of this paper is to analysis effectiveness of the protective 
rule and their practical effects. 
Design/approach - This paper reviews the most important tentative rules and 
focusing on the principal agent model, which considers the functioning insurance 
policy to give equality protection. The research has a crucial to analyses the 
current mechanism of protection policy of cause for disfunction of rules, it 
actually causes the most orientation to be assumed by labour migran as a principal 
and the subject of the protection policy. Case study in East Java, Indonesia.  
Findings – This mechanism appears theoretically coherent with the protection 
policy, of equality among labour migran with their performances, but this effect is 
baced on the benefits of their future performance; this is happened only within 
their state that their work. The paper concludes that the best effective protection 
for the labour migran who be a strong protection of the strong coordination actors 
or the harmonization concepts – by a system of information, professional 
procedure, capable of reducing as much rules, either pre-existing of the design 
protection policy.  
Value – The paper offers insight into the issue of whether rules protection 
actually produce equality among migrant labour. 
 




The protection effort for lndonesian migrant labour is an alternative to create 
insurance policy for wages transparency, Health, work safety, but it does not 
focus on law issue only. Thus, the significant point exists on the program 
functionality, so it needs relevant modified effort without leaving some rules of 
law through insurance scheme (Simitsia & kallopi, 2014). In Indonesia, migrant 
labours get protection on insurance scheme form. All along, The implementation 
has involved the other actor through the authority delegation of that actor 
(Private). Indonesian migrant labour as the doer who spends some money for this 
insurance should has been seen as a subject of that insurance scheme service, and 
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government as regulator has been known as a protector and a supervisor of that 
implementation. Then, the private authority (insurance consortium) is chosen and 
given mandate by the Indonesian migrant labour and the government to organize 
its insurance. 
 
The insurance scheme of Indonesian migrant labour is as a government policy in 
giving protection and also as insurance facility of health and work safety. The 
implementation goal of this policy depends on the doer who is involved in the 
process of implementation (Mthethwa, RM, 2012), That is shown by the doer role 
of that policy and its cooperation pattern (Groenningsaeter & Riina Kiik, 2012). It 
also happens in the implementation of this social insurance of indonesian migrant 
labour, The government gives power and authority to the private authority 
(insurance consortium). This way is appropriate with the Minister of Manpower 
and Transmigration regulation in number 7 of 2010 about Indonesian labour 
insurance.  
 
In the minister regulation, It has been explained that the authority of insurance 
implementation is insurance company which has license from the Ministry of 
Manpower and Transmigration, that is insurance consortium which gives service 
in handling a risk tackling of financial loss, functional loss, and law responsibility 
to the third side which appears from unsure event, it is related to life or dead of 
people who guaranteed by it, and compensation fulfilment of insurence by taking 
action for insured behalf. Meanwhile, as a party which do the operational of 
placement implementer of Indonesian migrant labour protection is The Natioanal 
Agency for placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Labours, so there are 
some parties which collaborate in organizing and implementing this policy, those 
are government as a principal (principal for organizing the insurance of 
Indonesian migrant labour and social insurance regulator of Indonesian migrant), 
Indonesian migrant labour as a principal (principal for the amount of money 
which is paid as a premium form to the insurance consortium) and Insurance 
consortium as an agent (Implementer and organizer of Indonesian migrant labour 
insurance). 
 
When doing the research of introduction, it revealed that insurance consortium 
which has currently covered the Indonesian migrant labour is “Protect TKI”, it 
prevails on July 2013, the insurance of Indonesian migrant labour is organized by 
3 (three) consortiums (Jasindo, Astindo, Mitra TKI). The Insurance registration of 
this Indonesian migrant labour is able through the placement implementer of 
private Indonesian migrant labour (PPTKIS) or the applicants of Indonesian 
migrant labour themselves, but it is mostly through placement implementer of 
private Indonesian migrant labour (PPTKIS). Premium is paid in the beginning 
that the amount of it based on the article 15 of clause (2) of the Indonesian 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration regulation No. Per-07/Men/V/2010 
about Indonesian migrant labour insurance, It is mentioned that the premium is 
about Rp. 50.000 for pre-placement, Rp. 300.000 during placement and Rp. 
50.000 for full of placement period. Thus, It is clear that the applicants of 
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Indonesian migrant labour will get protection during pre-placement, placement 
period and full of placement period. Principals which paid by the aplicants of 
Indonesian migrant labour will be known as insurance when they get accident , 
and even death. Absolutely, that premium covers all the things which harm the 
aplicants of Indonesian labour migrant. However, It is often that the insurence 
does not accomodate the harm of labour aplicants when they are in training 
period, Such as when they do not get proper training or all the things which are 
not organized in Insurance contract agreement, that should get insurance in getting 
training and safety of doing training (Crouch, 2014). All along, Insurance program 
for Indonesian migrant labour has given very limited protection and it generally 
covers accident and death insurance only, Whereas, all they need is protection for 
their selves during working and also for their families who are left (ILO, 2012). It 
means that the protection which guaranteed by insurance consortium of 
Indonesian migrant labour is the protection which fulfills pure risk elements, it 
has meaning that a risk which has financial value is a loss which truly happens 
based on the amount of paid premium.  
  
This insurance is for all Indonesian migrant labours, however, It is often met some 
cases that Indonesian migrant labour has not got the true social insurance yet, it is 
caused by the insurance which given, that only gives a loss which felt by 
Indonesian migrant labour in pre-placement, placement period, and full of 
placement. So that, There is still the other social problem that related to fulfill 
regulation for getting some facilities promised by the insurance. It can happen 
because there are many parties who do not stand for the Indonesian migrant 
labour, and there is no coordination with institution that involved in the process of 
pre-placement, placement period, and full of placement (Azmy, 2012). Whereas, 
in those three processes, there are many involved actors of institution, those are 
government as a contoller and implementer of sosial insurance policy, PPTKIS as 
a partner of government in implementation of pre-placement process, insurance 
consortium as an organizer of the Indonesian migrant labour insurance, and 
Indonesian migrant labour as a main actor in giving authority to the insurance 
consortium for organizing their insurance. Those actors contribute in some 
mechanisms. 
 
Meanwhile, in the mechanism of social insurance implementation of Indonesian 
migrant labour still leaves some problems, that main problem is in the 
effectiveness of this protection to Indonesian migrant labour. thus, the problem 
which happens in organizing of this Indonesian migrant labour social insurance is 
in mechanism problem, all along, the insurance company has only prioritized the 
advantages they get than a service they give (Farbenblum, 2013). Whereas, the 
management of partnership should not only be provided by economic principals 
but also by principals to serve (Rossi & Renato, 2014). This research will explore 
“does formal rule and the other rules are able to produce the effectiveness of 
protection policy implementation through equpping of insurance for Indonesian 
migrant labour ?”. 
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II. Method  
This research applied phenomenological analysis with perspective of principal 
and agent theory and also policy theory. Collecting data was done by exclusive 
interview to Indonesian migrant labour, aplicants of Indonesian migrant labour or 
ex-Indonesian migrant labour who come from East Java, Indonesia. 
 
III. Result  and Discussion 
 
Indonesian Migrant Labour Perception to the Effectiveness of Function and 
the Institution Role of Indonesian Migrant Labour Protection  
 
Based on the function and the role of institution which manage this Indonesian 
migrant labour protection managed in the act of No. 39 of 2004, Indonesian 
migrant labour is seen as an individual who appreciated with the rights on them, it 
is protected by that act, and based on that act, the Indonesian migrant labour has 
obigation to protect their self by obligatory buying/ registering their self in the 
social insurance scheme called Indonesian migrant labour insurance. Additionally, 
the basic right guaranteed for all people, state through the government and the 
institution partner has very important function and role. This is very essential for 
giving insurance of protection for Indonesian migrant labour, especially for 
contract/agreement that tied among Indonesian labour migrant and PPTKIS, 
Indonesian migrant labour and consortium, because that agreement is very private 
so that the access of Indonesian migrant labour protection becomes a need. All 
along, the access in giving Indonesian migrant labour social insurance service has 
been given by the government in the insurance scheme that protected in act of No. 
39 of 2004, Permenakertrans of No. 7 of 2010 dan its alteration of  No. 1 of 2012.  
 
However,the protection given is not whole social insurance because it is only 
given in financial compensation form. To assess the effectiveness of institution 
authority which manage this socila insurance, an Indonesian migrant labour stated 
her disappoinment to the government, this is Retno’s statement : 
  
“Where is the government when we get trouble?, if we do not scream out, they 
will not know. Perhaps, They have many jobs, so we seem as their step children, 
we are not served well” (Indonesian migrant labour). 
 
so, Indonesian migrant labour is used to get bad service and it has been started 
since pre-placement, it is caused by many institutions which manage this sosial 
insurance of Indonesian migrant labour, so Indonesian migrant labour only wants 
to get satisfaction of service, and they also think that all the things happened are 
usual. As this following statement of Aeranda : 
  
“It usually happens, we are ignored, they always say that we are foreign exchange 
heroes but they treat us well if they need, we are used to be screamed out, we are 
used to be a ball, their duty is not like this, it should be appropriate with each 
function, is it truly like this?, perhaps, it used to be managed by private company, 
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so when they manage it themselve, They can not do it well ” (Indonesian migrant 
labour) 
 
The service of all institutions which involved in the Indonesian labour migrant 
protection  is seen by Indonesian migrant labour as unacceptable things, although 
they are used to get it but they are not used to handle those all themselves. It used 
to handle by mitra agents. All along, they can call crisis center if they have 
problems or suggestion of unsatisfiable thing toward institutions’ service which 
involved in placement and protection of Indonesian migrant labour. By using 
crisis center provided by government, it should help Indonesian migrant labour to 
inform all problems that they get, especially placement period. However, in some 
cases, they choose to not ask for help to the embassy or to not call to the crisis 
center. 
 
Less of Indonesian migrant labour’s trust to the governtment service and their 
partner can become cause of unawareness to the service given by the government. 
Many Indonesian migrant labours has got information to call  24 hours crisis 
center or the other facilities that given  if the get trouble, but they prefer to believe 
in Indonesian migrant labour association of the country they work in. Crisis center 
service is able to be accessed easily. As a service that receives all lamentations  
and problems of Indonesian labour migrant, this access needs telephone or 
internet only. Additionally, iy is not only about untrusted service problem but also 
accessbilities problem, although they have crisis center. The significant challenge 
is in telephone or internet service, and also they have limited ability in using 
telephone or internet, Although they know telephone number that able to call 
when they get problem, but it can not guarantee to solve their problem. This 
accessbilities are related to the document completeness, as the following 
statement of Nur cahyo below :  
 
“ I ever wanted to call the Indonesian embassy of Jeddah when I was working 
there, but I did not know the location of the office, the distance of my place and 
the embassy office is very far. Finally, I had ridden taxi for 12 hours, when I 
arrived there, I informed that I was sick but my boss forced me to work 
continuously, then I ran, but my passport was brought by my boss, so I could not 
finish my problem at that, even I ever worked in Malaysia, and I got a same case, 
then the embassy refused to help me, they said that I was illegal migrant labour” 
(Indonesian migrant labour) 
 
Documentation can be an obstacle of accessibility, the obstacle is unconditional 
document. Embassy or the other institution which has function to protect has not 
been able to give maximum service. All problems got by Indonesian migrant 
labour should become responsibility of those institutions to solve it. However, 
when confirmed to government through section chief about their protection, the 
embassy refused to explain that case because they thought that it was a mistake of 
migrant labour. A good service comes from work quality of the human resource. 
A service quality depends on official who serves, are they able to work based on 
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capcity or they have no quality, so it effects to the service given, although this is 
an individual problem but it is a part of institution.  
 
Indonesian Labour Migrant Perception to the Effectiveness of Protection 
Management (Insurance) of Indonesian Labour Migrant 
 
Although, Insurance program is obligatory program for Indonesian migrant 
labour, but a program awareness in Indonesian migrant labour environment is still 
low. They do not know when asked about insurance, Most of them do not know 
about it. This is the following statement of Nur Cahyo : 
 
“I know about the obligatory insurance only, but I do not understand, what is 
insurance?, It seems that I do not have that insurance because I do not hold 
anything, I only know about passport and I have it, I do not know” (TKI / 
Indonesian migrant labour) 
 
This migrant labour mentioned that there were insurance and it was obligatory, 
but he did not know the function of it, and he also did not know a form of it. 
Because of it, the awareness of insurance is not follewed by their enthusiasm to 
know this insurance program. Moreover, Aeranda told that most of her friends did 
not think registered insurance in Indonesia, This is the following statement of 
Aeranda:  
 
“I know many migrant labours, I really know them, they do not know that they 
register insurance, if they have problem, they come to association, They ask for 
help, I told to them that we have insurance, but they did not know about it, yeah I 
knew that they did not know about it, even they do not awareness to register, yeah 
I know it  because  all companies has managed it, I also did not know it before, 
finally I know it some” (Indonesian migrant labour) 
 
The statement of Aeranda told that not all migrant labours have awareness about 
this insurance program. This ignorance causes a meaningless awareness for them. 
However, it becomes a note for the government that a low awareness comes from 
information failure which should been done by PPTKIS, this authority does not 
explain about the advantages of insurance, so they do not want to copy that 
document. The biggest obstacle of migrant labout accessibility to the procedure in 
regestering insurance claim. Although, all of these are managed by PPTKIS, but 
this obstacle is also caused by Indonesian migrant labour as principal which do 
not have complite information. 
 
This less information problem causes the adverse selection, it happens because 
principal is not able to choose qulified principal (Witesman, 2013). Such as, 
applicants of migrant labour who do not have ability to choose insurance 
consortium, and government who does not have ability to choose a qualified 
insurance consortium which appropriate with the government’s need (the 
selection of consortium process is located in the Ministry of Manpower and 
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Transmigration centre office area). The selection of agent should base on 
rationality of election, that is the potential of each actor to act as the principal’s 
need (Graziano, 2015). Based on that statement, Indonesian migrant labour will be 
a loss side, it is caused by the agent role which wants to get more benefit through 
giving particular information to the principal (Riaz, et all, 2014). Whereas, All 
parties that involved in that agreement have mechanism to express all relevant 
informations with all they need (Suryo & Agita, 2013), and it does not happen to 
the Indonesian migrant labour and the government because of less information 
they have.  
 
This unperfectness focuses on uncomplete information, untransparent, and unclear 
in explaining to them. That information are also given by asymmetry, so there are  
only some people who know more than others in same position. Additionally, 
There is other side who hides  that information to get some benefits, and there is 
also other side who unable and limited to get that information, so that, he / she 
will be in a loss side, he / she should get all those informations. 
 
The difficulty of claim procedure makes them to be lazy for submitting some 
claims, they should get compentation for the loss that they got, or they think that 
they can handle their problem without submitting a claim. It is mentioned by the 
statement of that migrant labour, the biggest challenge of procedural insurance is 
when submitting a claim. Lack of awareness and comprehension of insurance and 
its procedure of that claim becomes a main cause. So that, accessibility to the 
procedure is very low. The second obstacle is geography factor problem. The 
offices are located in big cities, and most of migrant labour work in area which 
has a long distance with the offices.  
 
Most of migrant labour who as informers of this research become critical ones if 
they are asked to tell about insurance procedure, this criticsm appears because of 
many informations that they do not know. Insurance submission procedural of 
Indonesian migrant labour has been managed in the procedure operational 
standard which had by consortium, so they are able to understand the mechanism 
of procedural insurance. When a researcher asked to the consortium for the 
improvement data of claim submission or migrant labour insurance procedure, the 
answer explained that the mechanism of submission was not for public 
information, and when the researcher asked to the government about it, The 
answer said that problem which related to the migrant labour insurance had been 
on process. They did not explain about detail of mechanism clearly. Researcher 
did not accept the answer of detail information that related to the procedural 
mechanism of migrant labour insurance, especially about claim submission.  
 
Low authority control for Indonesian migrant labour and government as principals 
states that Implementation of migrant labour insurance explicitly depends on the 
actor.  Although, it has managed in the act of No. 39 of 2004, Permenakertrans 
No. 7 of 2010, and its alteration of No. 1 of 2012 about all institution which has 
authority of this indonesian migrant labour insurance scheme, and it was 
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mentioned that the insurance related to the Indonesian migrant labour protection. 
A whole implementation is on insurance consortium’s hand and also role of mitra 
agent which dominates for Indonesian migrant labour, so the justice actualization 
of a role based on the act of No. 39 of 2004 has not yet implemented well.  
 
Thus, protection concept stated in the act of No. 39 of 2004 actually gave base 
method for the instutions to do their job based on their each authority. At the same 
time, that act gave conflict space in dividing some unbalance and unfair 
authorities. The dependence relationship among the actors has shown that there 
are many spaces to make some conflict among them. Conflict defined by Nugroho 
(2013) is conflict which seen as a fact. This fact happens in collective life which 
understood as a competition to get a scarce resource.  
 
The conflict happens to the applicants of Indonesian migrant labour / migrant 
labour in considering as a side who has a role but it is asked for their 
responsibility, and also for government as a side who has responsibility to the 
migrant labour protection. Indeed, some problems appears because dependence of 
big actors. Finally,  it seems that the problems “let to hang them up”, those are 
caused by principal powerlessness to the agent. In this case, especially for about 
function of government as a “base line of all business” for Indonesian migrant 
labour should be handled and dominated by the government. 
 
Meanwhile, government “lets” it to be controlled  by consortium side (agent) 
staying in powerlessness of authority with all of obligaton which should be 
finished. Whereas, for Indonesian migrant labours, Those are controlled by mitra 
agent staying in powerlessness of financial, but it consists of the obligation to join 
in the migrant labour insurance by completing the other obligations. It will be 
complicated conflict. Whereas, conflict will be more complicated if the actor 
really believes for the powerlessness related to the resources that they have 
(decision) (Nugroho, 2013). It means that conflict still happens not only related to 
behalf of problems but also scarcity of resources and value in interacting among 
the actors. The interaction success among the actors are mostly definited by their 
capacity to “carry on the conflict” and their ability to “disentangle” the conflict 
because they want it or not, they has made their own destiny with that conflict, but 
this suspended actors should realise that conflict which dominated by 
authoritzation will  make them loss (low capacity). However, all interactions work 
on the corridor which managed in the act or other informal rule.  
 
If this insurance scheme is dealt by management form related to the act of No. 39 
of 2004, Permenakertrans of No. 7 of 2010, and its alteration of No. 1 of 2012, it 
appears a next question. That question is “ are the act and that regulation able to 
guarantee the sovereignty of the whole institution autonomy of each actor ?, but it 
is only the implementation of act and that ruegulation which consisted of traps 
caused by interaction of agent to agent, agent to agent’s partner or even principal 
to agent’s partner. Finally, those traps have potentiality to appear a conflict, the 
regulation has a big dependence among the actors, especially for the government 
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and the insurance consortium. Meanwhile, the interaction of conflict relation 
between Indonesian migrant labour and PPTKIS is caused by Indonesian migrant 
labour powerlessness for the financial and the ability and taking a decision.  
 
Based on that reality , the policy goal among the conflicts can be solved  if there is 
a  high standar in level of goal, or minimum risk and failure (although it is found a 
conflict),  that are cost approachment, benefit share, or risk share (Nugroho, 
2013). From that nugroho statement, Undirectly,  it can be assumed that the policy 
will be reached, even the purpose of the policy will be stated based on the 
possibilities which will be received by all actors. It means that the government 
and the Indonesian migrant labour can spend some money or the other cost as a 
consequance of a conflict caused by resource powerlessness (financial for 
Indonesian migrant labour,and information for the government), or there is a 
transparency in sharing the benefit among the actors. So the goal of Indonesian 
migrant labour Insurance policy as social insurance implementation of migrant 
labour is depended on agreement design, although, it will find a conflict among 
the actors in the implementation of design.  The act of  No. 39 of 2004 definitely 
gives traps for the actor authority in organizing indonesian migrant labour 
insurance. In the detail of identification before, it was found that insurance 
consortium as strong actor because of their authority that they have, and mitra 
agent dominated for the information that they have. Whereas, government has 
limitation in the information resource and the authority that effects to the 
decission making, and the applicants or Indonesian migrant labours are powerless 
to give their authority to mitra agent in using their rights to choose and share the 
things that related to it. Although, Indonesian migrant labours have individual 
right to choose consortium based on their own choices, but they also have limited 
capability. They keep staying in powerless side, even the partnership relation in 
this Indonesian migrant labour is definitely very individual.  
 
Thus, it defines that insurance consortium actor and their mitra have power to give 
pressure to the Indonesian migrant labour and the government, It is caused by 
their powerlessness. The center of authority is agent (insurance consortium) and 
PPTKIS as an estuary of authority for Indonesian migrant labour (it is also as a 
consortium partner). Those explanations effect to the decision rationality which 
made by each actor. Each actor take a role based on their behalf, that is 
maximizing their own utility. Meanwhile, Indonesian migrant labour and the 
government can only escalade the authority position because of the act of No. 39 
of 2004 and the other regulation which stated it, so that it needs to make 
agreement to make it balance for all parties. 
 
The agreement of collaboration result puts the Indonesian migrant labour to not 
get position and capability to determine how this agreement made because this 
agreement has already made by consortium and government will verify it in the 
next process. Indonesian migrant labour only signs it as a proof  to agree this 
agreement, Although they do not have authority to give their own opinion or give 
idea about it. Based on the detail and explanation before, so it can be known that 
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authority pattern for adaptation among the actorss as a communication pattern 
related to the need of each actor resource. It means that adaptation of role is 
needed in the interaction which depends on the owner of the greates number of 
resources (Insurance consortium), so that needs need adaptation of role with a 
value that exists in the actor’s environment. This difference and clarity of role 
bring impact to the goal of authority process (communication) in the interaction of 
actor. The more the difference of role is clear, the more the structure of authority 
and its value are ambiguous, but the more the interaction process is melting, the 
more value and its structure are clear. Those dominate altogether for the behalf of 
every side. It also happens in lobbying process when they get insurance issue, 
That only insurance consortium has decision authority, so Indonesian migrant 
labour as the owner of primium money does not bargaining power at the process, 
and government also can not involve more when it is related to the completion 
process of Indonesian migrant labour insurance problem. Therefore, The 
mechanism of principal agent management in giving protection for Indonesian 
migrant labour is still in coordination form which managed in the informal norms.  
 
Additioanlly, Interaction pattern reflects the structure of authority (North, 1991), 
It is appropriate with North’s statement, so hierarchical coordination pattern also 
reflects the structure of hierarchical authority, but the interaction pattern is not 
about hierarchical, it is about collaborative. It means that the authority structure is 
influenced by dependence of each actor (based on the identification before) which 
stated that the goal of Indonesian migrant labour insurance policy depends on the 
quality of the actor who dominates the greatest resource, and the institution 
environment who involves the actor work in interacting (such as value and norm). 
It focuses on the adaptation of need among the actors. So the pattern or authority 
system which currently exists as the output of the interaction intervention among 
the involved actor.  
 
Finally, some the effectiveness of protection policy problem was identified 
through Indonesian migrant labour perception for the role and function 
effectiveness of policy authority institution, and their perception for procedural 
insurance effectiveness. Based on this following findings, so it can be told that the 
effectiveness of Indonesian migrant labour pretection policy is not in accordance 
to the ability of protection policy to give a “truly” protection for Indonesian 
migrant labour. It happens because of unawareness of Indonesian migrant labour, 
the protection mechanism still leaves unfair problem of information service, 
coordination and alteration need of protection design.  
 
IV. Conclusion 
Indonesian migrant labour scheme becomes abligatory scheme which should be 
paid by the applicants of migrant labour, it is hold by private insurance 
consortium to give compensation to the applicants of migrant labour or 
Indonesian migrant labours which get a risk of loss when in pre-placement, 
placement period, and full of placement. The amount of premium cost which paid 
in pre-placement period is Rp. 50.000, Rp. 350.000 is for placement period, and 
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full of placement period is Rp. 50.000. The total premium cost paid by them is 
Rp. 400.000 altogether.  
 
However, work plan, institution and insurance procedure of Indonesian migrant 
labour as a social insurance of migrant labour in the application consists of 
problem which unappropriate to the act and the other regulation. Firstly, as the 
people of Indonesia, Indonesian migrant labours are not protected in the act of 
social insurance, and Indonesian migrant labours are seen differently with the 
other domestic labour, so in the insurance social, they need specific scheme in 
outside of current BPJS scheme, that is Indonesian migrant labour insurance 
scheme.  
 
Technically, Institution work plan of Indonesian migran labour insurance with 
their procedural insurance consist of many problems, so it makes migrant labour 
perception related to the that institution service included their awareness, they still 
do not believe in that service, they also still find some difficulties to the access 
problem, although they know about crisis center. It is caused by the limitedness of 
Indonesian migrant labour telephone or internet service and document 
completeness. However, through the ownership of this insurance, government has 
protected them from risks which got by them when in pre-placement period, 
placement period, and full of placement period. The insurance implementation 
given to the insurance consortium consists of the authority overflow for 
Indonesian migrant labour insurance management.  
 
The effectiveness of Indonesian migrant labour policy needs coordination of 
strong institution in the regulation harmonization concept, It consists of 
information system affirmation, professional procedure, affirmation of some 
regulations and even affirmation of protection policy design for Indonesian 
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